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In-group favoritism is a central aspect of human behavior. People often help members of their own group
more than members of other groups. Here we propose a mathematical framework for the evolution of
in-group favoritism from a continuum of strategies. Unlike previous models, we do not pre-suppose that
players never cooperate with out-group members. Instead, we determine the conditions under which
preferential in-group cooperation emerges, and also explore situations where preferential out-group
helping could evolve. Our approach is not based on explicit intergroup conflict, but instead uses
evolutionary set theory. People can move between sets. Successful sets attract members, and successful
strategies gain imitators. Individuals can employ different strategies when interacting with in-group versus
out-group members. Our framework also allows us to implement different games for these two types of
interactions. We prove general results and derive specific conditions for the evolution of cooperation based
on in-group favoritism.
I
n-groupbiasisacentralaspectofhumanbehavior.Acrossavarietyofscenarios,peopletendtobemorehelpful
tomembers oftheir owngroup ratherthanto thoseof other groups
1–5.In-groupfavoritism hasbeenshown to
occur based on real-world salient groupings, such as ethnicity
6, religiosity
7 and political affiliation
4,8, and has
also been artificially manufactured in the laboratory using trivial groupings
1,3,9. Discrimination based on group
identity is a powerful force for both good and ill in human societies. Therefore understanding the evolutionary
dynamics of group identity and discrimination is of primary significance
10. Evolutionary game theory offers a
powerful framework for exploring such issues
11–24.
In-group bias is common, yet the implementation of that bias is dynamic and flexible
8,25,26. Thus culture and
cultural evolution
27must play an important role in the evolution of bias. The dynamic nature of bias results from
complexsocialnetworkinteractionswhichplayacentralroleinhumansocieties
28–36,withgeneticaswellassocial
components affecting network formation
37–39. Such network dynamics can turn yesterday’s allies into today’s
competitors, and drive former enemies together in the face of a common threat. This is true of many hunter-
gather societies which are characterized by fission-fusion dynamics
40, suggesting the importance of flexible
groupings for early human societies. Group identities are also flexible in today’s modern world: the dynamic
remodelingofin-groupbiaswasrecentlydemonstratedinabehavioralstudyusingeconomicgames
8.Duringthe
2008 US presidential election, supporters of Democratic primary candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
formed two separate groups, and showed strong bias against each other. After the transition from the primary to
the general election, the two groups fused and intra-Democrat bias disappeared.
Thus group membership is itself an evolving feature of humans. If membership in a particular group is
associated with a particular strategy, it can be beneficial to act differently towards members of different groups.
This was demonstrated in a recent behavioral experiment involving a series of coordination games
9. In each
round, subjects chose both a cultural group (represented by one of two arbitrary markers) and an action in a
coordination game. Subjects tended to change tag and action together, or to change neither. This created an
association between group membership and strategy, and in-group favoritism emerged: subjects preferred to
interact with members of their own group.
Themulti-faceted,dynamicandemergentnatureofgroupidentityiscentraltobias.Itsevolution,however,has
notyet beenexplained, asprevious modelsconsidered eithercompetition betweenstable fixedgroups, orapriori
imposedin-groupbiasonagents.Inthispaperweintroduceanovelmodeltoaddressthisissue(Fig.1,seemodel
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SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2 : 460 | DOI: 10.1038/srep00460 1details in Methods section). We utilize the framework of evolution-
arysettheory
23.Agentsaremembersofoneofmanydifferentgroups.
We allow players to take different actions towards in-group and out-
groupmembers.Learnersimitategroupmembershipaswellasstrat-
egy and both imitations occur with potential mistakes (set and strat-
egy mutation rates). Thus a strong association between group
membership and strategy exists (as in the experiments of Efferson
et al.
9), although no selection occurs at the level of the group. In this
setting, natural selection favors preferential cooperation with in-
group members. Furthermore, we observe dynamic group composi-
tions.Playerstendtojoingroupswithmanysuccessfulmembersand
abandon groups whose members earn low payoffs. Sometimes cer-
tain groups are abandoned entirely; sometimes empty groups are re-
populated when an individual strikes out on her own. Thus group
membership is varied, endogenous and fluid, and in-group bias
emerges through co-evolution of group membership and strategy
without invoking the mechanism of multi-level selection
41,42.
Results
Although our framework allows us to study many different evolu-
tionarygames,inthemainpartofthispaperwefocusoncooperative
dilemmas,whereindividualschoosebetweencooperationanddefec-
tion.Astrategyisgivenbytwoparameters,(p,q),wherepdenotesthe
probabilitytocooperatewithanotherindividualinthesamesetandq
denotes the probability to cooperate with an individual in another
set.Ifp.q,thencooperationisbiasedtowardsin-groupmembers.If
p , q, then cooperation is biased towards out-group members. Our
strategy space consists of a continuum of strategies represented by
the unit square, [0, 1]
2. It includes ‘always defect’ (0, 0) and ‘always
cooperate’ (1, 1), strategies which either do not recognize group
membership or choose to ignore it. The strategy (1, 0), conversely,
shows maximum in-group favoritism: it always cooperates with in-
group members but never with out-group members.
In Fig. 2 we show computer simulations of the stochastic evolu-
tionary dynamics of our system. We use agent based simulations for
intermediate intensities of selection. Each individualis characterized
by a particular (p, q) strategy. The figure shows the stationary distri-
butionofstrategiesthatisreachedinthismutation-selectionprocess.
We observe that the distribution is either peaked around ‘always-
defect’ (0, 0), or maximum in-group favoritism (1, 0). We are inter-
ested in finding the conditions for evolution of in-group favoritism
(Fig. 3).
Using the analytical theory for weak selection we calculate the
region of the strategy space that is favored by natural selection. In
the online material we perform this calculation for all cooperative
dilemmas,butherewepresenttheresultforthesimplifiedPrisoner’s
Dilemma, where cooperation implies a cost, c, for the donor and a
benefit, b, for the recipient, where b . c . 0. Defectors pay no cost
and distribute no benefit. We find that the (p, q)-strategy space is
intersectedbyastraightline,givenbytheequationq5K(p21/2)1
1/2, where K is the slope of the line. The explicit expression of K
depends on the benefit-to-cost ratio, b/c, the number of sets, M, and
the rescaled strategy mutation rate, m, and the rescaled set mutation
rate, q (see the online material for derivations). Strategies below the
line (lower q values) are favored by selection, and strategies above
the line (higher q values) are opposed by selection (Fig. 2). The line
always intersects the strategy (1/2, 1/2) which is neutral for all para-
meter choices. The maximum slope of the line is 11 and the min-
imum slope is 2‘. If the slope is negative (K , 0) then the most
favoredstrategyisalways-defect(0,0).Iftheslopeispositive(K.0)
then the most favored strategy is maximum in-group favoritism
(1, 0).
Thereisanotherinteresting threshold.IfK,21thentheaverage
p value in the population is less than the average q value. In this
(paradoxical) case, individuals are more likely to cooperate with
out-group members rather than in-group members. The reason is
the following: for these population structures cooperation is not
selected and, moreover, most interactions occur within sets; it is
therefore more costly to cooperate with individuals in the same set
ratherthanwithindividualsfromanotherset.Hence,forK,21our
system predicts some level of out-group favoritism. For K . 21 the
average p value in the population is greater than the average q value.
Thus K . 21 is the crucial condition for the evolution of at least
some degree of in-group favoritism, while K . 0 is the condition for
selection to favor maximal in-group favoritism (1, 0).
Furthermore, these two critical thresholds of K also determine the
population average levels of in-group helping p and out-group help-
ing q. The average p is greater than 1/2 greater than the average q for
K.0,theaverageqissmallerthantheaveragepsmallerthan1/2for
21,K,0,andtheaveragepislessthantheaverage qlessthan1/2
for K , 21. Note that natural selection always disfavors out-group
helping (the average q is less than 1/2 for all parameter choices),
whereas in-group cooperation can be favored by selection (the aver-
age p is greater than 1/2) if K . 0.
Forlargepopulationsizeandinthelimitoflowstrategymutation,
m R 0, the condition K . 21 leads to
b
c
w
qq z2 ðÞ
2{ M=2 ðÞ q
3z3q
2zq{3
  
M{1 ðÞ qq z2 ðÞ
ð1Þ
while K . 0 leads to
b
c
w
qq z2 ðÞ
2zM q
2z3qz3
  
M{1 ðÞ qq z2 ðÞ
ð2Þ
We observe that increasing the number of sets, M, reduces both
critical benefit-to-cost ratios. Increasing the set mutation rate, q,
always reduces the critical benefit-to-cost ratio that is needed for
the evolution of some in-group favoritism (1), but for evolution of
maximum in-group favoritism (2)there isan intermediate optimum
set mutation rate (of order of q<
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
M
p
) which minimizes the critical
benefit-to-cost ratio. We also note that condition (2) is the same
condition that is needed for evolution of cooperation in set struc-
Figure 1 | ‘‘In-group/out-group’’ evolutionary dynamics. Individuals are
distributed over groups. The interaction structure of the population is
given by a two-colored graph: from the point of view of a focal individual,
its encounters are either in-group or out-group. Individuals may use
different strategies for in-group and out-group interactions, and even
different games can be played within and between groups. Individuals
interact with everyone else according to their prescribed behavioral
strategies. Both individual strategies and group memberships are updated
proportional to payoff.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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23. Noteworthy, the evolution of some in-group
favoritism can be promoted for any benefit-to-cost ratios if the set
mutation rate q is above a certain threshold depending on the num-
ber of sets M $ 3 and the strategy mutation m. In the online material
we provide further discussion of these conditions and also study the
effect of the strategy mutation rate, m. Our analytical results are in
excellent agreement with the agent based simulations.
Discussion
We have demonstrated how individual-level selection can favor
the emergence of in-group bias in a world of dynamic social ties
and group identities. We consider the full continuum of strategies
for both in-group and out-group interactions, not just those that
show in-group favoritism. We also include strategies which do not
discriminate between in-group and out-group members, as well as
strategies which give preferential treatment to out-group mem-
bers. We derive the conditions for natural selection to favor the
recognition of group membership, and for the ensuing success of
in-group favoritism (Fig. 2).
Previous theoretical studies have examined the thought experi-
ment of the green-beard effect (or tag-based cooperation), finding
that cooperation can evolve when similar others receive preferential
treatment
15,18,19,21,22. Phenotypic tags in these models can be regarded
asasortofminimalgrouping.Incontrasttoourpresentmodel,these
previous models assume a priori that individuals never cooperate
with out-group members, and therefore group structure (as in an
island model) supports the evolution of within-group helping
48,49.
Yet empirical evidence indicates that although people exhibit more
in-group cooperation than out-group cooperation, cooperation with
out-group members is still far above zero
8,44. Thus unlike previous
Figure 2 | Evolutionary panorama of in-group favoritism. Shown are the stationary distributions of strategies over the unit square with respect to
varying(a)costofcooperation,c,(b)numberofgroups,M,(c)strategymutationrate,u,and(d)migrationratebetweengroups,v.Thecolorbarindicates
the equilibrium abundance of strategies: red means high while blue low. The straight lines, below which strategies are favored by natural selection,
representouranalyticalpredictionsforweakselection.Apositiveslopesuggeststhatthelower-rightcorner(1,0),maximumin-groupfavoritism,ismost
favored. We find excellent agreement between our analytical theory and computer simulations. Increasing c and u values each disfavor the emergence of
in-group favoritism, while increasing M helps its establishment. An intermediate optimal migration rate v most promotes the evolution of in-group
favoritism.Parameters:N5100,b50.005,b51,(a)M54,u50.04,v50.06,(b)c50.1,u50.04,v50.06,(c)c50.08,M54,v50.06,(d)c50.08,
M 5 4, u 5 0.06. Results are averaged over T 5 2 3 10
9 time steps.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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cooperation, and determine the conditions under which preferential
in-groupcooperationisfavoredbyselection.Asseenexperimentally,
we find the emergence of in-group bias together with substantial
levels of out-group cooperation.
A second set of previous models consider in-group helping and
out-groupharminginthecontextof explicitintergroup conflictwith
discrete (binary) strategies
20,24,50. Two of these models use simula-
tions to explore the evolution of such ‘parochial altruism’, and find
that explicit inter-group conflict is needed for selection to favor
bias
20,24: groups with more in-group helpers and/or out-group har-
mers battle and replace other groups. A third model also considers
intergroup conflict as the driving force behind bias, and derives
analytical results. However, we note that their approach requires
infinitely many groups of fixed size, applies only to additive games,
and only gives the direction of selection (rather than any actual
evolutionary dynamics) for mutant invasion attempts at a locus
without polymorphism at the other locus. Unlike these models, we
show that sensitivity to group identity need not be the result of such
intergroupconflict,butinsteadcanresultfromparticularpopulation
structures. Furthermore, our approach yields general analytical
results, characterizing the full evolutionary dynamics of our system,
and can easily be applied to a range of ‘‘in-group/out-group’’ inter-
actions (including, but not limited to, additive games).
Ourmutation-selectionanalysisshowsthatincreasingthestrategy
mutation rate m always makes it harder for cooperation to predom-
inate (Fig. 3c), but that this is not the case for the set mutation rate v:
there is an optimal level of q for promoting in-group cooperation
(Fig. 3d). In our model, prosperous groups tend to attract new indi-
viduals,whichcanbeseenas‘payoff-biasedmigration’
45–47.However,
this non-random migration cannot promote the success of in-group
solidarityifthesetmutationrate,or‘confusionabouttheother’sset’,
is too low. Without flexibility in group identity (q R 0) all indivi-
duals eventually end up in the same group, and then the system is
prone to exploitation of in-group members. This is why some out-
group favoritism can evolve under this circumstance. On the other
hand,whenthesetmutationrateisexcessivelyhigh(qR‘)andthus
groupidentitiesareoverlyfluid,theassociationbetweenstrategyand
group membership breaks down. In our model, as in behavioral
experiments
9, this correlation between strategy and group member-
ship is essential for the establishment and maintenance of in-group
favoritism. Thus evolution cannot favor in-group cooperation if q is
toolarge.Anintermediatesetmutationrateisoptimal,maintaininga
delicate balance between mobility and consistency.
Our work generates testable predictions about evolved human
behavior. For example, we find that a larger number of possible
groups leads to stronger selection for in-group bias (Fig. 3b). This
has implications both for laboratory experiments and field studies.
Most existing laboratory experiments with economic games use bin-
ary groupings
8,9, but our theory predicts stronger in-group bias if a
richer setof groupings wasused. Psychological research isconsistent
with this prediction
52. Our results also suggest that people who
developed their intuitions in more diverse communities, where a
widerrangeofpossiblesocialgroupsexist,willdemonstrate stronger
in-groupbias.Evaluatingthesepredictionsusingquantitativeempir-
ical analysis is a promising research direction.
The framework we introduce here is not limited to the study of
cooperation. It is a general theory for studying situations where one
gameisplayed with in-groupmembers whileanother gameisplayed
with out-group members. For example, our framework can explain
the evolution of costly in-group helping and costly out-group harm-
ing
42 (see the online material). Applying this model to a variety of
other social behaviors such as coordination, trust and bargaining
51 is
an important topic for future study, as is exploring situations where
individuals are members of multiple groups with competing alle-
giances. Extending this framework to coalition formation
53,54, which
cannot always be reduced to pairwise interactions, will be useful.
In-group bias is a central aspect of human behavior
1–9,25,44. This
sensitivity to group membership may seem to imply a key role for
inter-groupconflictinhuman evolution. Yet,whileinter-group con-
flict can promote theevolution of in-group bias
20, todo soit requires
stable groups whose membership remains largely unchanged over
time. Contrary to this vision of stable groups, experiments
8,25 and
anthropological evidence
40 have demonstrated that group identity
and membership is often flexible. Over short timescales, the relevant
grouping can be remodeled, leading to dramatic changes in behavior
towards the same set of others. Here we show how in-group bias can
evolveandthrivewhengroupcompositionsareconstantlyshifting.It
can be advantageous to love your friends, even when today’s com-
rades might be tomorrow’s enemies.
Methods
Model.Westudy theevolutionarydynamicsofapopulation offinitesize,N,which is
distributed over M sets. Each individual belongs to one set. Without constituting
more complicated group culture or identity, this minimal group setting in our model
is similar with trivial groupings in previous empirical studies
1,3,9. Individuals engage
in evolutionary games and accumulate payoff from pairwise interactions. Note that
the payoff of an individual depends both on its strategy and on the set it belongs to.
Figure 3 | Evolutionary determinants of individual in-group and out-
group preferences. (a)–(d) show how the population average p and q
values are determined by model parameters. Strengthened selection can
cause the most favorable strategy to move from the lower-right corner,
maximum in-group favoritism, towards the lower-left corner, defection.
Under some circumstances (K . 0), as shown here, increasing selection
pressure b first enhances in-group favoritism, but opposes it when b
exceeds a certain threshold. The greater the number of groups, the more
biased individuals become: They maintain in-group helping at high levels,
but shun helping the out-group. Increasing the strategy mutation (or
experimentation) rate, u, leads to reduced in-group and out-group
helping. An intermediate migration rate between groups most enhances
in-group helping while most reducing out-group helping. Parameters:
(a) N 5 100, M 5 100, b 5 1, c 5 0.1, u 5 0.002, v 5 0.1, (b) N 5 100,
b5 0.01, b 5 1,c 5 0.2, u 50.01, v5 0.1, (c) N 5 100,b 5 0.01, M 5 10,
b 5 1, c 5 0.1, v 5 0.15, (d) N 5 100, b 5 0.01, M 5 15, b 5 1, c 5 0.15,
u 5 0.01. Results are averaged over T 5 2 3 10
9 time steps.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Reproduction can be genetic or cultural. That said, successful strategies spawn
imitators and successful sets attract more members. Therefore, the population
structure is dynamic and driven by the social interactions. To study the limiting
distribution of strategies under mutation-selection equilibrium, we include a strategy
mutation rate, u, and a set mutation rate, v. The latter represents random migration
between sets. It is useful to consider the rescaled mutation rates, m 5 Nu and q5 Nv,
in the theoretical analysis. At times some sets can become empty to be re-populated
later. It is also possible that occasionally the whole population clusters in one set,
although increases in set mutation tend to make the population dwell in a mixture of
different sets most of the time.
Each individual plays with all others: interactions occur both between individuals
in the same set and between individuals in different sets. Here we consider equal
interaction rates within and between sets, an assumption that can be easily modified
by introducing an additional model parameter (see the online material). What varies
between in-group and out-group interactions is the strategy used by each individual,
and potentially the nature of the game that is played. At any one time the interaction
structure of the population is given by a two-colored graph (Fig. 1). The individuals
represent the vertices of the graph. The colors signify the two types of interactions:
within sets (in-group) and between sets (out-group). The graph changes as indivi-
duals move between sets. Individuals may use different strategies for in-group and
out-group games. We can also consider situations where different games are being
played within and between sets. For example, the game between sets could be an
aggression game, but the game within the set could be a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Analysis. In the online material we develop a general analytical theory for such ‘‘in-
group/out-group’’ evolutionary processes. We consider two different games for the
two types of interactions and each game can have any number of strategies. The
behavioral rule of an individual is given by a pair of strategies determining the
behavior with members of the same set and with members of other sets. Our model
does not involve inter-group conflict
20: there is no reproduction of groups and no
competitionbetweengroups.Instead,ourmodelisbasedonevolutionarysettheory
23
andusesageneralresultforevolutionarygamedynamicsinstructuredpopulations
43.
We derive a condition for a behavioral rule being favored by natural selection in the
limit of weak selection. In this limit the two games (within and between sets) make
additive contributions. The population structure is described by six structural
coefficients (three for each game) that depend on the number of sets M, the strategy
mutation rate m and the set mutation rate q.
Specifically, the analysis is greatly simplified for in-group and out-group interac-
tionsbothwithtwostrategies.Supposethein-group gamematrix(Avs.B)isgivenby
[R, S; T, P] and the out-group game matrix (A9 vs. B9) is given by [R9, S9; T9, P9]. If A
(A9)isacooperativestrategyandB(B9)isadefectivestrategy,thenwehaveR.Pand
R9.P9. The strategy (A, A9) is favored over (B, B9)i f
k1 R{P ðÞ zk2 S{T ðÞ zk1 ’ R’{P’ ðÞ zk2 ’ S’{T’ ðÞ w0,
where k’s are structural coefficients determined by model parameters and, for low
strategy mutation and large M, we have:
k1~ 1zq ðÞ q 2zq ðÞ zM 3z2q ðÞ ½ 
k2~ 3zq ðÞ q 2zq ðÞ zM ½ 
k’
1~Mq 1zq ðÞ 2zq ðÞ
k’
2~Mq 2zq ðÞ 3zq ðÞ :
We can see that the in-group game can promote cooperation (k1 . k2), but the out-
group game always opposes cooperation (k1 ’vk2 ’). This result can help us intuitively
understand the evolution of in-group favoritism from a full continuum of strategies.
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